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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 10, Number 6 (April 28, 2005) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Russia's path 
President Vladimir Putin addressed the Federal Assembly this week in a speech 
that delineated this stage in Russia's development as founded upon Russian 
history – recent and far distant – but likewise shaped by post-Soviet 
developments in the economic, judicial, and security climates. 
 
Most remarkably, Putin fully distanced himself from the last vestiges of linkage 
with the Yel'tsin regime, calling the disintegration of the Soviet Union "the 
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." (1) What was once the most-
vaunted achievement of the Russian presidency, the destruction of the CPSU-
ruled Soviet empire, has now been redefined as a tragedy from which Russia can 
but hope one day to recover.  
 
Note the list of ailments Putin identifies as emanating from the poison post-Soviet 
tree:  "tens of millions" of Russians left "outside the Russian Federation" in now 
independent states; "citizens' savings lost their value; "old ideals were 
destroyed;" institutions were disbanded;" the "country's integrity was disturbed by 
terrorist intervention and the ensuing capitulation of Khasavyurt;" "groups of 
oligarchs served exclusively their own corporate interests; "mass poverty" 
became "accepted as the norm;" all occurring within the context of a "severe 
economic repression, unstable finances and paralysis in the social sphere."  (2)  
 
Democracy appeared not as a saving grace following years of CPSU stagnation 
and misrule, but rather as another step toward the Russian state's "final 
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collapse."  It is within this context that Putin identified the necessity and resolve 
of Russia "to find its own path toward building a democratic, free and just society 
and state."  (3) 
 
To dwell on the repudiation of the Yel'tsin legacy for a moment:  It occurs that 
Putin would have to be extremely comfortable in his presidency to move so 
openly and so far afield from the first Russian President, by whose influence 
Putin was himself installed as successor.  The flaws of the Yel'tsin presidency 
are manifold, public and yet insidious.  Nonetheless, Putin's assurance that he is 
no longer beholden to the "Family" is notable.  
 
Interestingly, one element of Putin's address that has garnered a great deal of 
attention:  the critique of his team, the government and general bureaucratic 
corruption, well could have been lain at the feet of the previous regime, and yet 
was not.  While changes to the nature of the Kremlin and governmental apparat 
have been obvious during Putin's presidency, most notably the influx of siloviki 
and the presence of advisers from St. Petersburg.  On the whole, siloviki 
appointments have been directed toward the security, defense and advisory 
sectors.  The St. Petersburgers are a mixed group with ties as strong to Chubais 
and the first Yel'tsin economic team as to the current president.    The economic, 
financial, foreign affairs, social, judicial and legislative sectors are populated as 
much by those with ties to the Yel'tsin Family as to the current President. 
 
[Chubais played up the image of the St. Petersburg advisors in a recent 
interview:  
Chubais:  The St. Petersburg mafia is forever, and we can reach anywhere.  
That's true. 
Anchor:  I hope the pope will not be from St. Petersburg at least. 
Chubais:  I will have to think it over. (4)] 
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When Putin castigates the bureaucracy as "a closed and sometimes simply 
arrogant caste, which sees state service as a kind of business," he is speaking 
as much to vestiges of previous administrations (including Soviet, of course) as 
to a creature of his own presidency.  (5)  Interestingly, many drew from Putin's 
words the need to reshape the government team.  Following the benefits 
monetization fiascoes, a personnel shake up in the government indeed may be 
overdue. 
 
Ideologically, Putin's address covered the highlights of liberal philosophy – he 
even condemned overly aggressive police actions (specifically regarding tax 
collection).  The thrust of his  address however, aimed at asserting a uniquely 
Russian road:  "Russia is a country that, by the will of its own people, chose 
democracy for itself.  (Š)  As a sovereign country, Russia can and will 
independently determine the timing and conditions of its progress along this path. 
(6) 
 
Rosewood 
Der Spiegel has a fascinating story about the final days of the East German 
government, and how a little known Russian KGB officer sold a wealth of 
information to the CIA.  The incident, dubbed "Rosewood," continues to have 
repercussions.  Although the informant, who asked a mere $75,000 for the file 
cards, remains unidentified, two CIA officers are now describing the fortunate 
circumstances that saved the records of all the East German agents from being 
destroyed as ordered by the Stasi's HVA (Main Administration for Intelligence 
Collection). (7) 
 
The files, which included annual reports by individual HVA departments, were 
offered up by the Russian KGB officer stationed in East Germany, at a U.S. 
Embassy.  His motivation was thought to be simply monetary.  Although arrests 
for espionage did result from the information provided in these files, the 
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information leading to the arrests was reported to have come from inside the 
crumbling Soviet establishment, in order to protect the Rosewood files.  (8) 
 
So, does anyone know a Russian KGB officer, stationed in East Germany in the 
late 1980's to early 1990's who might be able to shed some light on this 
situation? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) RTR TV, 0800 GMT, 25 Apr 05; BBC Monitoring via Johnson's Russia List 
(JRL), #9130, 25 Apr 05. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Interview with Anatoli Chubais, NTV Sunday Program, 17 Apr 05; The 
Federal News Service via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) RTR TV, Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Der Spiegel website in German, 18 Apr 05; BBC Monitoring, 19 Apr 05 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
In an investigative report published in Novaya gazeta, reporter Yelena Milashina, 
using leaked transcripts, demonstrates that federal authorities from Moscow 
Center were in command of the forces that responded to the Beslan Middle 
School Number 1 siege last September, and not Aleksandr Dzasokhov, the North 
Ossetian President, or Valeri Andreyev, head of the North Ossetian branch of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), as many had assumed.  Instead, according to 
 5 
Dzasokhov, Colonel-General Vladimir Pronichev and Lieutenant-General 
Vladimir Anisimov, two of FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev's four deputies, along 
with other Moscow-based personnel, were dispatched to the local command 
center to monitor and direct efforts. (1)  Andreyev, possibly the most visible 
public official during the standoff with the hostage-takers (and who reported 
officially-sanctioned, though incredibly low, hostage numbers to on-scene media 
early in the siege when, it appears, more accurate numbers were available) 
retained his post following the bloody end to the siege; Dzasokhov remained in 
place as well, vowing instead to dismiss the entire regional government.  The 
only local official to resign was North Ossetian Interior Minister Kazbek 
Dzantiyev, but there was no word on his testimony in Milishina's report, nor on 
that of Pronichev or Anisimov.  Furthermore, there was no indication in this report 
that FSB director Patrushev or MVD (Interior) Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev were 
involved directly, even though initial reports on the Kremlin's actions during the 
siege indicated that Putin sent them both to Beslan quite early in the course of 
events. (2)  
 
If true (despite what appear to be gaps thus far), and many analysts believe the 
report to be credible, it provides more evidence of the Kremlin's desire to 
centralize control over counter-terror efforts in the region, especially high-visibility 
efforts like Beslan and the assassination of Maskhadov.  (See previous NIS 
Observed.)  It also emphasizes that the FSB leadership is (or was at the time) 
the top choice to lead such efforts, despite the fact that Putin gave the MVD the 
lead in Caucasus counter-terrorism efforts following last summer's raids into 
Ingushetia by Chechen rebels.  (3)  Without the context of the complete report, 
however, further conclusions are difficult to draw.  But unofficial analyses may be 
useful, as is the fact that someone or some organization felt strongly enough 
about this information to leak it for publication. 
 
While the Beslan tragedy came without warning, there is much to anticipate on 9 
May.  That date marks the one-year anniversary of the assassination of the 
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"popularly elected" Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov, father of current Chechen 
Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, who is the de facto head of pro-
Moscow Chechen security forces in the region.  It also marks the 60th 
anniversary of Russia's Victory Day holiday, marking the end of World War II in 
Europe, and U.S. President George W. Bush will be in Moscow to celebrate the 
event with President Putin. (4)  Recent press reports indicate that Chechen 
terrorist Shamil Basayev plans to launch attacks in and around Chechnya to 
coincide with celebrations and begin what has been called the "Summer of Fire," 
a season of stepped up terrorist attacks.  (5) It is not known, however, whether 
the attacks are to be confined to Chechnya or will target other areas of Russia as 
well, but previous attacks, not just in Beslan but in Moscow itself, indicate that he 
and his rebel forces probably have the ability to strike in a variety of sectors 
across Russia. 
 
In anticipation of such attacks, Russian forces recently conducted a five-day 
counter-terrorism exercise in the Southern Federal District.  The command-staff 
exercise involved units from the Ministry of Defense, the federal MVD, North 
Caucasus District Internal Troops, the FSB, and other associated departments.  
A Nezavisimaya gazeta report said the theme of the exercise would be, "Actions 
to be taken by federal executive-branch agencies and their territorial subdivisions 
in the event of sudden escalation of the situation," but no mention was made 
specifically regarding the participation of Ramzan Kadyrov and his forces, so 
called kadyrovtsy. (6)  A Stratfor report also claims that in February President 
Putin directed a stepped-up effort to eliminate all major Chechen terrorist 
commanders, an effort that the FSB continues to date. (7)  This is presumably 
the effort that resulted in the death of Maskhadov.  Interestingly, there continues 
to be a relative lull in rebel terrorist acts in the region.  In the month before his 
death, Maskhadov had called for a unilateral ceasefire, ostensibly as a goodwill 
gesture but also perhaps to show that he still retained control over rebel forces 
and was in a position to negotiate, should Putin ever change his mind.  (8) After 
Maskhadov's death, announced on 8 March, Chechen rebel forces were 
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obligated to observe 40 days of mourning.  There some anxiety as the region 
braces for what appears increasingly to be the inevitable rebel retaliation, and the 
anticipation is heightened by not knowing exactly when these attacks might 
begin. Nevertheless, federal FSB forces have continued publicized attacks on 
Chechen rebel leaders in recent weeks. These raids, it should be noted, have not 
involved kadyrovtsy. (9) 
 
Offering his own brand of security and peace of mind, Ramzan Kadyrov has 
vowed that by 9 May he will find the name of his father's killer and that he will kill 
Basayev.  (Ever the braggart, one wonders why he has not done so sooner.)  
Kadyrov professes to be conducting his own investigation and, indeed, claims 
already to have a name, though he's awaiting confirmation.  The office of 
Chechnya's prosecutor had no comment.  (10)   Kadyrov also claims to be "close 
on the heels" of Basayev, having reportedly captured the latter's artificial leg!  His 
forces have stepped up efforts in the region, but their efforts do not seem to be 
coordinated with those of other security forces. (11)  It should be recalled that 
federal FSB personnel was given credit for killing Maskhadov, although there 
was some question on that account, but Kadyrov admittedly was not involved. 
 
Kadyrov has become a larger-than-life figure in the region, but, from Moscow's 
point of view, at least he's ostensibly the Kremlin's larger-than-life figure.  And as 
Maskhadov is no longer in a position to reclaim the leadership of the republic, 
Kadyrov is seen by some as becoming an increasingly attractive figure for the 
Kremlin to install following elections in the region later this year.  But he comes 
with baggage, to put it mildly.  Clearly a more visible and brash leadership figure 
than the current Chechen President Alu Alkhanov, Kadyrov and his forces come 
under regular criticism for violence against fellow Chechens, most recently in a 
Human Rights Watch report (see previous NIS Observed).  His voice can be 
heard providing an opinion, perspective, or rebuttal to most events in the region, 
and his comments certainly appear to be unscripted by the Kremlin. 
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Which brings up the question, what precisely is the relationship between Ramzan 
Kadyrov and the Kremlin?  As reported previously, the Kremlin has begun what 
appears to be a de-Chechenization policy in the region, apparently believing that 
local forces are untrustworthy and riddled with security leaks.  But whereas 
Alkhanov provides the Kremlin with a stereotypical sycophant in charge in 
Chechnya, Kadyrov provides a much more charismatic character, after a 
Chechen type, with command of forces and plenty of latitude in their conduct.  So 
when he works beyond the control of Kremlin forces in the region, is he acting 
simply as vigilante, or has he become Putin's version of a useful idiot? 
 
A recent article in Novoe vremya suggests that Kadyrov and Basayev represent 
two competing powers in Chechnya, competing for the allegiance of the Chechen 
people.  Over time they have created a feud in the region, but this feud provides 
its own form of stability.  At this point, most Chechens have made up their minds, 
even as different allegiances may divide villages.  This situation, the article 
suggests, has forced Basayev to look for new recruits from outside Chechnya, 
evidenced by the increasing numbers of non-Chechens captured in government 
raids.  This means a relative calm in the countryside, as recruiting efforts appear 
to have been ended effectively. (12)  This Russian-style stability, bearing 
resemblance to other so-called frozen conflicts in Russia's near abroad, suits 
Moscow well:  A simmering feud that does not boil over, does not call undue 
outside attention to itself, and does not hinder other state activities. 
 
This constitutes an interesting theory, to be sure, but having seen the ability of 
Basayev's forces to wreak havoc outside of Chechnya, whether at a school in 
Beslan or with a suicide bomber in Moscow, Chechnya can hardly yet be called a 
frozen conflict.  And Russian security services' intervention in the region over the 
past few months indicates the status of the conflict is still by no means 
acceptable.   However, the operational wall Moscow has built between federal 
forces and kadyrovtsy does lend support to the theory—perhaps a simmering 
feud is a longer range goal in the region.  And, certainly, since Basayev's support 
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in the region does not appear to be increasing, this assumption, if true, makes 
Kadyrov somewhat more useful to the Kremlin. 
 
From Moscow's perspective, however, such a long-range plan simply will not 
work, at least not with the current cast of characters.  Basayev's survival is a 
liability to Russia, far more detrimental than was Maskhadov's.  His demonstrated 
capabilities constitute a direct threat to the state, so it is understandable that he 
should be targeted for elimination, and no doubt federal forces in the region are 
attempting to do just that.  But assume for the moment that Kadyrov actually has 
the capability of which he boasts—to kill Basayev himself.  If he could, is it in the 
Kremlin's interest to have him do it? 
 
Probably not.  For such an act (assuming most lower-level Chechen rebel 
commanders were eliminated as well, as appears to be the Kremlin's plan) 
probably would propel Kadyrov (and his ego) into a new level of leadership in the 
region—drawing his supporters even closer (and those Chechens who do not 
support him into his camp out of fear), realizing there is no counterbalancing 
force in the region.  Then, even with President Putin's new authority to select 
regional leaders, installing anyone but Kadyrov at that point would prove 
popularly untenable.  Kadyrov, by most accounts a politician much less politically 
savvy politician than his father, may very well create an even bigger mess in the 
region, making the Kremlin long for the Chechen experiment of the late 1990s 
with Maskhadov at the helm. 
 
So, look for an even greater increase in scope, scale, and intensity from federal 
security services' operations in the region prior to 9 May, without help from the 
kadyrovtsy.  Despite being foreigners in the region, they will make every effort, 
short of aligning with Kadyrov, to kill or capture (and then kill) Basayev.  If 
terrorist attacks should take place before he's captured, expect federal forces to 
respond rapidly, with FSB forces in charge, to end the situation with a better 
outcome than Beslan or the Moscow theater siege, and at least a few captured 
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terrorists (although that fact might not be released publicly).  From the evidence 
thus gained, federal forces will tighten the noose around Basayev and his 
lieutenants until they have nowhere else to run. 
 
Once Basayev is eliminated (no matter who is responsible), perhaps by the end 
of summer, Kadyrov's usefulness to the Kremlin, such as it has been, will have 
ended.  Do not look for his name among the candidates for Chechen elections in 
the fall. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nabi Abdullaev, "Report: Beslan HQ Was Run By Others," The Moscow 
Times, 15 Apr 05, p. 3 via 
(http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/04/15/011.html); Lawrence A. 
Uzzell, "Documents Suggest The Feds Were In Charge During Beslan," 
Chechnya Weekly, 20 Apr 05 (Volume VI, Issue 15), The Jamestown 
Foundation. 
(2) The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, Volume IX Number 14, 15 Sep 04. 
(3) Nabi Abdullaev, "Police Role May Pass Back To FSB," The Moscow Times, 
25 Feb 05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(4) "President to travel to Latvia, the Netherlands, Russia, and Georgia in May 
2005," Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Mar 24, 05 via 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050324.html). 
(5) Lawrence A. Uzzell, "Newspaper: Basaev is planning A Victory Day Attack," 
Chechnya Weekly, 6 Apr 05 - Volume VI, Issue 14, The Jamestown Foundation; 
and Andrei Riskin, "Law Enforcement Agencies Treat Chechen Terror Threats 
'Seriously'," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Apr 05 via World News Connection. 
(6) Andrei Riskin, "Law Enforcement Agencies Treat Chechen Terror Threats 
'Seriously'," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 Apr 05, via World News Connection. 
(7) Liz Fuller, "Who Will Strike First Following Maskhadov's Death?" Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 76, Part I, 22 Apr 05. 
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(8) Nabi Abdullaev, "Maskhadov Raises Stakes In Chechnya," The Moscow 
Times, 8 Feb 05 via 
(http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/news/20050208_Abdullaev.htm). 
(9) Fuller, Ibid. 
(10) Alexandra Larintseva, Musa Muradov, "Akhmad Kadyrov's Murderers To Be 
Named On The Victory Day," Kommersant, No 67, 15 Apr 05, p.6 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(11) Lawrence A. Uzzell, "Ramzan Vows to kill Basaev by May 9," Chechnya 
Weekly, 20 Apr 05 , Volume VI, Issue 15, The Jamestown Foundation. 
(12) Vadim Dubnov, "A Leader Who Knows He is Doomed," Novoe vremya, No. 
13, 4 Apr 05, p. 8; What the Papers Say, 11 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Whose will shall be done? 
Following terse remarks from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who 
stated that Belarus is "the last true dictatorship in the heart of Europe," adding 
that it is time for change in that country, (1) President Putin met with Belarusian 
President Lukashenko in Moscow for the second time this month. Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov responded indirectly to Dr. Rice, emphasizing 
Moscow¹s desire to increase relations with Belarus in the economic and social 
spheres. Stating that "democratic processes cannot be imposed from the 
outside," Lavrov added, "We are opposed to anyone dictating their will to 
sovereign states." (2) 
 
Moscow continues to denounce what it calls U.S. attempts to "export democracy" 
and impose regime change, especially in former Soviet territory.  The perception 
that the U.S. is trying to change the geo-strategic balance of forces in Eurasia 
has prompted Russia to value relations with countries like Belarus more than 
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ever.  Aleksei Makarkin of the Center for Political Technologies remarked, 
"Belarus is Russia¹s only military and political ally in Europe because it is a 
member of the union state and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In the 
near future, the two countries plan to create a united air defense system." (3) 
With Ukraine and the U.S. planning to cooperate on missile defense, and 
Ukraine¹s push to join NATO following its "orange revolution," Russia is focusing 
attention on Belarus. 
 
A time to laugh, a time to mournŠ 
Complicating relations with Israel, President Putin recently made a "joke" during 
an Israeli television interview regarding his confirmation that Russia indeed will 
complete a deal with Syria for advanced Igla (SA-18) antiaircraft missiles, despite 
objections from Jerusalem and Washington. When asked if the deal will cause 
Israel concern over security, Putin remarked, "It will, of course, make it difficult to 
fly over the residence of the Syrian president." (4) Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon disagreed with Putin¹s assessment that the missiles pose no threat to 
Israel; his concern is that the missiles could fall into the hands of a terrorist 
organization like Hezbollah. Does Russia, indeed, "fight terrorism with one hand 
but with the other [it] help[s] a state that supports terrorists" as Israel¹s daily 
"Ha¹aretz" commented? (5) 
 
With a recent visit to Moscow from Israeli parliamentarians, who focused 
attention on the Iranian nuclear program (6), and given Russia¹s continued 
collaboration with Egypt regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (7), it would 
seem that Russia is not helping to solve but complicating disputes in the Middle 
East.  Israel feels threatened both by Iran and Syria, and although Russia 
attempts to assure Israel that its efforts to keep Iran from developing nuclear 
weaponry are genuine, Israel remains unconvinced, despite a relationship with 
Russia that seemed to reflect increasing warmth in the past two years. (8) If 
Russia wants to keep Israel as a "key partner" with "friendly contact," perhaps it 
should at least consider that an arms deal is no joke. 
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EU prospects 
As the 10 May EU-Russia summit in Moscow approaches, President Putin awaits 
the opportunity to further the extent of relations with the E.U..  How this will be 
done—whether with mere declarations or agreements on specific projects—
remains to be seen. (9) Russia¹s stagnant democratic development makes it 
politically unwelcome in the EU, but geopolitical, demographic and cultural 
realties for Russia make a choice in favor of closer relations with the EU obvious.  
With an increasingly unstable situation in the Caucasus, a questionable 
relationship with China, and the growing number of countries in the post-Soviet 
space turning to the West, Russia must enhance relations the EU to impede what 
seems to be inevitable isolation. 
 
Currently, the EU accounts for 48.6% of Russia¹s foreign trade and Russia is the 
EU¹s fifth largest trade partner. (10) Traditionally seen as a source of raw 
materials and an exporter of gas and oil, one way for Russia to make itself a 
more attractive trade partner is to broaden its range of goods and services. Other 
issues that limit Russia¹s current relations with the EU include the Kaliningrad 
problem – namely, Russia's push for unlimited transit through Lithuania. 
 
President Putin recently received European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso to discuss cooperation with Brussels, ahead of the upcoming summit. 
The possibility of a Russian-Latvian border treaty, the Russian chairmanship of 
the 2006 G-8, and the issue of the status of Russian-speaking populations in the 
Baltic states were matters for discussion between the two leaders and will be on 
the agenda of the Moscow summit. (11) 
 
Rice¹s mixed signals 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Moscow last week and met 
with President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, keeping the focus 
mainly on security cooperation and muting U.S. criticism of the Kremlin¹s 
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"managed democracy."  Her strong words on the plane traveling to Moscow 
contrasted with the cautious terminology during her interview on Ekho Moskvy 
radio, one of Russia¹s largest relatively independent media sources. The major 
U.S. oil companies who want closer ties with Russia to enhance investment 
prospects, democratically-minded activists in Russia, and the Russian hawks 
who want the U.S. kept out of internal matters, for different reasons disliked 
these mixed messages. (12) Lavrov responded to Dr. Rice by preaching that the 
U.S. should act multilaterally and observe international law – an attack on 
American action in Iraq. (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 22 Apr 05, vol 9, no 76 via 
(www.rferl.org/newsline/1-rus.asp?po=y). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) RIA Novosti, 22 Apr 05 15:58 GMT via 
(http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050422/39726622-print.html) 
(4) Ibid., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 22 Apr 05, vol 9, no 76. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) RIA Novosti, 19 Apr 05, 22:47 GMT via 
(http://en.rian.ru/world/20050419/39705428-print.html). 
(7) RIA Novosti, 24 Apr 05, 14:03 GMT via 
(http://en.rian.ru/world/20050424/39732864-print.html). 
(8) Ibid., RIA Novosti, 19 Apr 05, 22:47 GMT. 
(9) RIA Novosti via Johnson¹s Russia List, 11 Apr 05, #28-JRL 9118 via 
(www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9118-28.cfm). 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline. 
(12) RIA Novosti, 21 Apr 05, 19:25 GMT via 
(http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050421/39721828-print.html). 
(13) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Electoral Reform 
There are more changes in the offing for Russia¹s electoral system. The law 
establishing the transition to completely proportional representation in the Duma 
passed its third reading on 22 April (339 in favor; 84 against). (1)  The law raises 
the entry hurdle into the Duma for party lists from five to seven percent; it does 
not mention a minimum number of parties who must be represented in the Duma, 
as had been speculated. The law includes a clause making it impossible for a 
Duma member to switch party affiliation without losing his/her legislative seat, 
presumably because now legislators will be elected entirely on party lists 
(whereas, previously, one-half of Duma members were elected in single-member 
constituencies, after as Independents. Moreover, the new law hinders separate 
parties from forming blocs. 
 
Several days before it passed the bill was criticized by Central Election 
Commission chief Aleksandr Veshnyakov (recently named Putin¹s representative 
for electoral reform) for its omission of a clause punishing any of the first three 
persons on a party list who run are elected and then decline to take their seats 
(effectively bequeathing these seats to other nominees of the party). United 
Russia experienced multiple cases of this phenomenon in the last elections when 
more than 30 regional leaders ran on the United Russia list and were elected 
without ever assuming their seats. (2)  Veshnyakov¹s degree of influence in his 
role as presidential representative appears questionable however, given the lack 
of impact his criticism had. 
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Prior to the law¹s passage, half of the members of the Duma were elected by the 
first-past-the-post concept in single-member constituencies. Although the law 
purportedly aims at strengthening the party system, at the moment most of the 
advantage appears to lie with a single party, the Kremlin's favorite United Russia, 
the party favored by the Kremlin, since the increased percentage hurdle for lists 
and the abolition of single-member constituencies will make it difficult for 
opposition parties to enter the Duma.  
 
United Russia may be facing changes of its own, however, with the party splitting 
into factions following public criticism of its platform by Vladimir Pligin, chairman 
of the Duma Constitutional Legislation and State Organizational Development 
Committee, and other United Russia members, including Aleksandr Lebedev and 
Andrei Makarov. The right leaning group composed an open letter criticizing the 
party¹s dependence on Putin¹s popularity for its support and declaring that United 
Russia is ill-prepared for the 2007 elections. (3) The factionalizing of United 
Russia might be a conscious effort to allow the party to distance itself from Putin 
in the 2007 elections, should his popularity decline, or it could reveal a true 
schism in a party that lacked a cohesive platform from its inception. 
 
Demographics 
The number of people living with AIDS in Russia has reached somewhere 
between 260,000 and 300,000, with eighty percent of that population falling in the 
15-19 year old age range. (4)  A recent World Bank study projects that, in the 
best case scenario, if the infection rate hits 2.3 percent of the Russian population 
by 2010 (2.3 million people), the GDP could be 4.5 percent lower than in AIDS-
absent conditions. More pessimistic estimates conclude that if no effective 
measures are taken to curtail the spread of AIDS, investment could drop by 14-
20 percent by 2020. (5)  UNAIDS, the United Nations society that deals with the 
AIDS problem, convened a meeting with more than 150 government and civil 
society representatives on 18 April in an attempt to work together on this threat. 
 17 
(6) Youth usually suffer the greatest impact from AIDS, raising the possibility of a 
serious constriction in Russia¹s work force if not properly addressed. 
 
Drug abuse also is on the rise. The official data estimate 350,000 drug abusers, 
with analysts such as first deputy chairman of the Duma's Health Committee, 
Aleksandr Chukhrayev, speculating that the actual numbers are nine or ten times 
higher than the official statistics. (7)  (Estimates vary considerably, as evidenced 
by Vladimir Yakovlev¹s comments below.) The number of drug related crimes 
was more than 380,000 in 2004, a 22.5 percent increase from 2003. A significant 
factor in the drug use figures has been the rapid influx of narcotics to Russia from 
Afghanistan. The situation has prompted statements and hearings by Russian 
legislators, but whether effective action can or will be taken remains to be seen. 
 
Drugs and other factors may be affecting the quality of Russia¹s work force, 
according to Regional Development Minister Vladimir Yakovlev. In a recent 
meeting of the Demography and Labor Resources Committee of the 
Competitiveness and Enterprise Council, Yakovlev concluded, "We have 10 
million working women. But out of 20 million men who are capable of working, 
one million are in prison, four million in the army, five million are unemployed, 
four million are chronic alcoholics and one million are drug addicts." (8)  Males 
are not the only population affected by drug use; women apparently are keeping 
pace with their male counterparts. (9)  
 
Like AIDS, the population most frequently affected by drug abuse is young 
persons, with, on average, 483 out of every 100,000 juveniles taking drugs in 
2003, as compared with 241 in 100,000 for the general population. Russia¹s 
population is decreasing due to a declining birth rate, which already raises the 
likelihood of a reduced work force. Trends such as increased incidence of AIDS 
and drug abuse, therefore, are all the more important to monitor and control 
because of their potential impact on Russia¹s economic growth and viability. 
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In March, Russia reiterated its willingness to work with NATO in addressing 
narcotics activity, presumably reaffirming the place of drug-trafficking and other 
related issues as a national security concern. (10)  However, the claim that drugs 
are a threat to national security may take on new meaning if drug activity is 
providing a valuable source of funding for radical Chechen separatists, as Major-
General Ilya Shabalkin of the regional operational headquarters for the counter-
terrorist operations in the North Caucasus has recently stated. (11)  The state is 
more likely to act on drug-trafficking issues if it is found to be linked with Chechen 
separatist activity. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Russian Duma passes election law granting proportional representation," 
ITAR-TASS, 22 Apr 05 via World News Connection (WNC). 
(2) "Proposed changes in election law strongly favor United Russia," Gazeta.ru, 
18 Apr 05 via WNC. 
(3) "Moscow website predicts changes in United Russia leadership," Gazeta.ru, 
21 Apr 05 via WNC. 
(4) "Number of AIDS cases reaches 260,000," RIA-Novosti, 25 Mar 05 via WNC. 
(5) "Spread of AIDS seen affecting potential economic growth," ITAR-TASS, 30 
Mar 05 via WNC. 
(6) "UN, Russia pool efforts in struggle against HIV/AIDS," ITAR-TASS, 18 Apr 
05 via WNC. 
(7) "Over 350,000 drug addicts officially registered in Russia," ITAR-TASS, 14 
Apr 05 via WNC. 
(8) "Russian minister says majority of working-age men incapable," RIA-Novosti, 
21 Apr 05 via WNC. 
(9) "Over 350,000 drug addicts officially registered in Russia," ITAR-TASS, 14 
Apr 05 via WNC. 
(10) "Russia confirms commitment to further counter-drug activities with NATO," 
ITAR-TASS, 30 Mar 05 via WNC. 
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(11) "Terrorist activities in North Caucasus financed by drug trafficking," ITAR-
TASS, 22 Apr 05 via WNC. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
Pressure continues to build 
There is considerable evidence that political pressure on the Russian 
government continues to build.  Should this pressure turn into unrest, to whom 
will the government turn for support?  The loyalty of the average armed forces 
soldier certainly has to be questioned.  The image of angry pensioners and 
reserve officers lining up at the post office to mail their pension supplements and 
benefits compensation checks back to President Putin helps to keep alive the 
widespread discontent that exploded over the monetization of benefits.  Putin will 
receive checks this month from indignant servicemen in both Ulyanovsk and 
Primorskii Krai. (1)  
 
Secret opinion polls taken by the Defense Ministry and leaked to the press show 
that 80% of the officers in the Russian Armed Forces do not support the policies 
of the Russian leadership. (2)  When asked for his response to the results of the 
poll, Major-General Nikolai Bezborodov, a member of the Duma's defense 
committee, was anything but surprised: "When we meet with officers to discuss 
monetization of benefits, they look lawmakers straight in the eye and say: 'we 
hate you!'" (3)  Military journalist Aleksandr Golts commented that "This poll 
highlighted a very interesting point linked to the military's extremely low respect 
for the country's current leadership...Officers are infuriated by the authorities' 
hypocrisy, shouting on every corner that they are the glorious defenders of the 
fatherland while at the same time doing nothing to improve their social standing." 
(4)  Although most analysts don't think the unhappy soldiers represent a threat to 
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the administration in terms of a coup, they agree that the soldiers loyalty (or lack 
there of) will surface should the government come under physical threat.   
 
Another private organization was recently formed of military men pushed to the 
"outside" by the current administration.  The Military Commander's Club, led by 
another former defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, differs in two major ways, 
however, from the Volunteer Troops and other organizations led by other military 
"outsiders" like Rodionov and Ivashov.  First, when discussing the purpose and 
objectives of the club with the press, Marshall Sergeyev did not come across as 
bitter or angry, but rather he was elusive, vague, and concluded that the Military 
Commanders Club was just interested in ensuring that the military experience 
represented by the group is available to assist officials in developing and 
implementing policies that make sense for the nation. (5)  But an even more 
important difference between Sergeyev's Commander's Club and Ivashov's 
organizations is that, whereas Ivashov and his crew were locked out of their 
planned venue by government officials, the Military Commander Club's inaugural 
ceremony was attended by the Russian Federation Foreign Minster, Sergei 
Lavrov.  Lavrov spoke at the meeting, claiming that he and the club both wanted 
to prevent "manifestations of ideological and political extremism, in Russia, in 
particular." (6)  Although the club is made up of those who have been placed on 
the "outside" by the current regime, obviously the leadership still sees this club 
as a possible ally and perhaps counterweight, should unrest bubble over in 
Russia. 
 
Another move that suggests the Kremlin is looking to solidify some reliable allies 
is President Putin's request for the Duma to pass a law that would institutionalize 
and broaden the practice of recruiting Cossacks to serve in various army and 
police units. (7)  Already, Cossack vigilante patrols assist police as well as work 
with border troops to guard Russian borders.  With more than 230,000 adult 
members willing to enter state service, the Cossacks represent a significant 
potential to assist in "maintaining order" across Russia. 
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Ivanov presses ahead 
The demonstrable dissatisfaction with Ivanov's directional military reforms 
appears to be growing.  In addition to the monetization of benefits, many blame 
Ivanov for the general deterioration of the socio-economic standing of the military 
(he has not requested military pay raises for soldiers for two years running), and 
the near-complete destruction of the combat capability of what was once the 
heart of the Red Army – its tank and motorized rifle divisions and combat air 
forces.  Despite this unhappiness, the Defense Minister continues to implement 
his plan for reform, using the same strategy over and over.  First, he probes the 
political environment with a strategic leak of an upcoming reform, lets the "heat" 
build and pass, and then creates, or is presented with, an appropriate political 
environment in which to make his move.  He fired Kvashnin this way in the wake 
of the invasion of Dagestan in June 2004; he neutered the General Staff in the 
fall out of the Kvashnin firing, and made significant troop cuts all in this same 
fashion.  None of these moves were popular with anyone.  Yet Ivanov continues 
to press ahead.  
 
Ivanov replayed this pattern with his recent statement decrying media reports, 
which claimed that the Defense Ministry is planning to reorganize the 6 military 
districts into 4 regional commands, form a separate special forces arm of the 
military, and cut another 250,000-300,000 troops from the armed forces over the 
next 5 years.  Ivanov denied these rumors on at least two separate occasions in 
words that seemed very explicit. (8)  The leaks about the reforms were reported 
in late March and caused some stir in the press (see previous NIS Observed).  
Ivanov's denials were very straightforward and brief, likely meant to relieve 
political pressure from segments of the security community who think the reforms 
are taking the army in the wrong direction, and from those who are likely to be at 
the losing end of the reforms.  
 
 22 
The rumors are, however, most assuredly true and very likely part of the Armed 
Forces Development Plan to 2010.  This claim is supported by several facts.  
First of all, the initial reports about the proposed reforms came from normally 
reliable segments of Russian media (RIA novosti, Gazeta.ru, and Ruskii kurrier).  
The reporters got their information from "a ranking source in the Defense 
Ministry" or "a source in the Kremlin administration."  The leaks were also fairly 
specific in nature and referenced the Development Plan for 2006-2010, a plan 
that has been in the works for some time and is very likely complete, as the 
reports mentioned. (9)  In a report released subsequent to Ivanov's denials, Gen 
Smirnov, deputy chief of the General Staff, started claiming that only 133,000 
contract soldiers will be needed to fill the ranks of the permanent readiness 
forces by 2008. (10)  No reason was given for his departure from the 144,000 
number used by everyone in the Defense Ministry until this point.  One 
explanation could be that General Smirnov knows that by 2008, only 133,000 
contract soldiers would be required once the planned drawdown is completed.  
Also, subsequent to Ivanov's denials, a source in the General Staff leaked to 
Vremya novostey that Ivanov already has picked the commander for the new 
Special Forces Command.  Lt-General Valeri Yevtukhovich, currently the Chief of 
Staff of the Airborne Troops, likely will command this new unit of the armed 
forces which is to be based upon units from the airborne troops and GRU 
spetsnaz. (11) Yevtukhovich led the Russian peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and 
oversaw the transition of the 76th Airborne Division to contract servicemen.  With 
wide experience in current combat operations and still a young man (only 51), 
Yevtukhovich seems an excellent choice. Despite Ivanov's claims that the rumors 
about a new military branch for the special purpose forces don't reflect reality, 
there seems to be an awful lot of detail already known about its structure. 
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence to suggest that the rumored reforms, despite 
Ivanov's denials, are included in the military's Development Plan, is the 
consonance between the reforms and Ivanov's world view.  Ivanov believes that 
in order for Russia to maintain its great power status and a global balance, it 
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must continue to upgrade its strategic nuclear forces.  The Defense Ministry is 
executing a plan to do that, and Ivanov has stated recently that he is comfortable 
that "Russia and U.S. are on par as far as strategic nuclear forces are 
concerned." (12)  Ivanov has also claimed repeatedly that Russian armed forces 
must be highly mobile and leverage the latest technology.  Thus, the most 
relevant components of the Russian military will be those with combat potential in 
a mobile environment.  Clearly these are the airborne troops and Special Forces, 
units that can operate in fairly large contingents under conditions short of war.  
These types of units are the first to transition to contract service and the first to 
receive the latest equipment.  The efficient organization of these forces under the 
Defense Minister will be vital to his ability to respond with effective force when 
needed. 
 
Budget realities are not lost on Ivanov either.  His defense budget is smaller than 
that of any other nuclear power and even smaller than at least one non-nuclear 
country, Saudi Arabia. (13)  In order to free up more of his budget to invest in 
modernization of these forces, Ivanov will have to continue to cut the cost of 
caring for and feeding the army.  Demographic trends, conscription shortfalls and 
low morale anyway already have reduced the readiness of many units to virtually 
zero.  It is clear that Ivanov plans to cut the cost of supporting this deadweight 
and continue to build those things he deems necessary.  This means more 
rounds of troop cuts. 
 
Finally, having essentially dismantled the power structure that once was the 
General Staff, Ivanov will next set upon another bureaucracy that he fights for 
control of the armed forces – the bureaucracies of the military districts.  In typical 
fashion, Ivanov plans to confront this bureaucratic roadblock by reorganizing.  By 
eliminating the military districts in favor of larger regional commands, Ivanov will 
be able to reshuffle his commanders, leaving him with fewer total commanders 
with which he will have to deal in order to control the army.  It also falls neatly in 
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line with rumors of political restructuring towards super-regions within the 
Russian Federation. 
 
Not much cynicism required 
For those with a little more cynicism, the rumor that Ivanov plans to combine the 
special purpose forces of the GRU with those from the MVD and FSB, (a move 
that he claims is not being enacted but is being discussed) can have only one 
purpose. (14)  In combination with the recent law to allow defense ministry troops 
to fight terrorism (broadly defined to include political extremism and separatism), 
the purpose of a combined special forces command will be to provide the Kremlin 
with the capability to combat any revolutionary unrest that might develop within 
Russian society.  As the "botanical" revolutions encircle Russia, Ivanov, with the 
help of the Cossacks, will have the tools to apply force (that was so clearly 
missing in the revolutions of the CIS states) to put down such a domestic threat 
should the need arise.  Ivanov is preparing for the threat environment of the 
future where the threats to the Kremlin are as likely to come from within as they 
are from without. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "More Retired Officers Send Compensation Checks Back to Putin," RFE/RL 
Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 73, Part I, 19 Apr 05 and "ŠAs Outraged Reserve Officers 
Send Their Cash Compensation Back to Moscow," RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 
70, 14 Apr 05. 
(2) "Russian Officers Have Fairly Substantial Reasons for Being Dissatisfied," 
Vladimir Ivanov and Igor Plugatarev, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 Apr 05; WPS – 
Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) "Expert Says Army Fed Up with the Government," RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, 
No. 70, 14 Apr 05. 
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(5) "Former Defense Minister of Russia Speaks of New 'Club of Military 
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RIA-Novosti, 19 Apr 05 via World News Connection (WNC). 
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05 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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Ivanov Denies Forming National 'Special Purpose Forces'," Agentstvo voyennykh 
novostey WWW-Text, 5 Apr 2005 via WNC. 
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World New Connection. 
(13) Ibid. 
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EXTERNAL 
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Ukraine's missile production future 
Ukraine, specifically the Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash companies, have played 
primary roles in the design and production of Russian strategic missiles and 
space launch vehicles since Soviet times.  But, much like the Ukrainian arms 
industry, the Ukrainian aerospace industry, specifically the rocket and missile 
design and production portion, is now at a crossroads.  President Viktor 
Yushchenko's pursuit of European integration may have a significant impact on 
Ukraine's aerospace industry and its current primary partner, Russia. 
 
A 25 January report from Interfax news agency stated that, despite the election 
of pro-western Viktor Yushchenko, ballistic missile cooperation between Russia 
and Ukraine would continue.  Aleksandr Ryazhskikh, former deputy command of 
the Strategic Missile Troops of Russia said that this cooperation was necessary 
to extend the service life of SS-18 and SS-19 missiles.  Ryazhskikh stated, "Up 
to 40 percent of the companies involved in Russia's ballistic missile production 
remain in Ukraine." (1)  Vladimir Dvorkin, the former head of the 4th research and 
development institute of the Russian Defense Ministry, involved research on 
strategic missiles, said "I believe that Kyiv will go on implementing the agreement 
on keeping Moscow's missiles, made in Ukraine, operational, and first of all the 
heavy class." (2) 
 
After President Yushchenko's early April 2005 visit to the U.S., he and President 
Bush signed a joint statement calling for their countries "to work together on 
missile defense, including beginning negotiations on a framework to facilitate 
such cooperation and closer industry-to-industry collaboration." (3)  It is not likely 
that Ukraine will be able to achieve the delicate balance needed to pursue both 
partnerships, so will the Ukrainian missile and rocket industry continue to have 
one dominant partner in Russia or will it, like Ukraine in general under 
Yushchenko's plan, turn toward the West? 
 
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation 
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Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in the area of missile and rocket design started at 
the earliest stages of Soviet ballistic missile development in the 1950's.  
Ukraine's design bureaus played a significant role as both a primary designer 
and subcontractor on numerous Soviet ICBM's and even the Soviet unmanned 
space program. 
 
At the height of the Cold War's arms race, Ukraine's involvement was as robust 
as ever.  The design bureau at Yuzhnoye designed the two-stage heavy liquid 
propellant ICBM SS-18 in the 1960's.  They were also heavily involved in the 
development of the two stage, tandem, storable liquid propellant ICBM SS-19, 
although this missile was designed and produced in Russia.  Ukrainian design 
bureaus devised the three-stage solid propellant ICBM SS-24 in the late 1970's 
as a replacement for the SS-19.  While the Russian design bureau created the 
SS-25 in the early 1980's, the missile still used significant Ukrainian parts and 
designs.  More than 90 percent of its guidance system was drawn up and 
produced in Ukraine. (4) The SS-27 Topol-M was the first strategic missile to be 
built by Russia without the participation of Ukraine. 
 
The Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START 
II) signed by Russia in May 2000, would have obliged Russia to dismantle all 
ground based ICBMs with multiple warheads.  During the February 2001 visit by 
President Putin to a Ukrainian missile plant and design bureau, Ukrainian officials 
acknowledged they were already assisting Russia in maintaining both SS-18 and 
SS-24 ICBMs in service. (5) 
 
On 13 June 2002, this cooperation would become more extensive; that is when 
the United States officially withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty, in order to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense system.  After 
the U.S. withdrawal, Russia decided not to ratify the START II treaty.  The death 
of START II meant that Russia could pursue a Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) that 
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is much more dependent on its older multi-warhead ICBM; as opposed to the 
more recently designed and deployed single warhead versions. 
 
Russia appears to be interested in maintaining much of its older, heavy ICBM 
force (SS-18, SS-19, and SS-24). As previously discussed, the SS-18 and SS-24 
are multi-warhead configured, but were designed and produced primarily in 
Ukraine which, depending on Ukraine's political environment, could complicate or 
even eliminate cooperation in modernization efforts.  Russia can still modernize 
the SS-19 component of its SRF; it is the only ICBM in inventory that is both 
already multi-warhead configured and produced mainly by Russian enterprises. 
The TOPOL missile (SS-25 and SS-27) while primarily designed and 
manufactured in Russia is single warhead configured.  The slow development of 
the SS-27, the consequent slow deployment rate, and the elimination of the 
START II requirements present Russia with both problems and options. 
 
U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation 
While direct military to military cooperation has been strong, especially in the 
NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the missile and rocket industry, 
again much like the defense industry, has remained almost exclusively a Russian 
area of cooperation.  In 2003, Ukrainian officials expressed a desire to participate 
with the United States in the possible development of a European theater missile 
defense system, but little cooperation developed. (6)  The one notable area of 
cooperation is in the international Sea Launch Project with Yuzhnoye and Boeing 
working with other partners to launch successfully 15 commercial payloads since 
1999.  With a change in Ukraine's political situation, it looks like the stagnated 
level of cooperation could change.  Earlier this year, there were meetings 
between Pentagon officials and executives of the Ukrainian missile and rocket 
industry to discuss increased cooperation.  
 
Two specific issues seem to be driving the increased desire for cooperation.  
First, is the testing of the U.S. missile defense systems.  Second, is a U.S. desire 
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to increase rapidly the transparency of Ukrainian defense and missile industry in 
order to limit potentially destabilizing proliferation of sensitive information and 
materials. 
 
The United States wants to conduct more robust testing of the national and 
theater ballistic missile defense systems.  Ukrainian rockets could provide the 
vehicles for further testing, specifically the Cyclone 3 rocket.  The Cyclone 3 is a 
three-stage liquid fuel vehicle that better represents future "Rogue Nation" 
threats than current U.S. test drones.  It is a 1970's design that has proven to be 
highly reliable with more than 27 successful operational launches since 1991. (7)  
In addition to the missile defense benefits, increased cooperation will help to 
engrain U.S. procedures with respect to information and material control limiting 
potentially dangerous proliferation of these technologies.  
 
Ukraine's industry position 
While Ukraine and the United States have more than a decade of military 
cooperation, most economic cooperation in the defense and aerospace field is 
fairly new.  Russia and Ukraine have a long history of successful cooperation and 
changing the Ukrainian aerospace industry's orientation may prove to be difficult.  
As late as 2003, former Khartron General Director Yakov Ayzenberg said that he 
believed Ukraine ought to aim for closer economic relations with Russia.  He 
even advocated selling large amounts of shares in Ukraine's aerospace 
companies to Russian companies. (8) 
 
Conclusion 
The pursuit of ballistic missile defense by the U.S. led to our abrogation of the 
ABM treaty, and the Russian decision not to ratify the START II treaty.  The 
cash-strapped Russians have decided to extend the SS-18, SS-19 and SS-24 
missile life, something that would have been significantly limited under START II. 
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Both of these endeavors would be enhanced by Ukrainian cooperation. Russia 
had the upper hand in this battle, until President Yushchenko's remarkable rise to 
power.  Now, as his pro-Western policy starts to trickle down and the U.S. starts 
to embrace Ukrainian aerospace with actual contracts, it appears that the 
possibility exists for far closer integration between the U.S. and Ukraine.  
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By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
Can a democratic revolution succeed in Belarus? 
Much has been said recently about a possibility of the next revolution happening 
in Belarus. Observers¹ opinions vary from "absolutely" to "never" to anything in 
between. Those who say that a revolution is likely often fail to look beyond the 
possible uprisings and protests to see the potential outcome. Recent revolutions 
in the former Soviet republics (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) led to changes, 
desired by the population, which nurtured beliefs that similar scenarios would 
unfold in other countries. 
 
The situation in Belarus is drastically different from any of the above republics, 
however. Lukashenko¹s iron grip on the country, coupled with his large, loyal 
entourage both in Minsk and in the regions make the success of a democratic 
revolution in Belarus unlikely. The low likelihood for success does not suggest 
however, that organizers will abandon efforts to bring people to the streets after 
Lukashenko¹s third presidential "victory" in 2006. 
 
Condoleezza Rice¹s recent meeting with two Belarusian opposition members in 
Vilnus, where she said that the "time for change is to come to Belarus," (1) and 
the U.S. Senate's decision to allocate an additional $5 million for programs 
supporting establishment of democracy in Belarus have reassured the 
opposition. (2) There is still more than a year for the Belarusian opposition to 
learn the art of organized protests with the help of international NGOs. Growing 
popular dissatisfaction with the lack of political and economic freedom in the 
country, as well as the inspiration from successful democratic revolutions in the 
former Soviet republics may prompt Belarusians to show their discontent with the 
current regime next year. Approximately 5,000 people came out to the streets of 
Minsk the day after the referendum – a number that might not appear large, but 
only 1,000 demonstrators in Bishkek were enough to launch a successful assault 
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on the government palace. Belarusian opposition leaders are optimistic. Vladimyr 
Kalyakin, the Communist leader, when asked whether he believed in a 
Belarusian revolution, answered: "Remember 1989. In the Soviet Union, there 
had never been free elections, but the repressive apparat was just as vicious as 
it is today under Lukashenko. Nevertheless, the regime collapsed because the 
people got fed up with it." (3) 
 
The biggest indication that a revolution is indeed possible is Lukashenko¹s 
behavior. A week does not pass by without the Belarusian President condemning 
revolutions in the post-Soviet states and threatening alleged conspirators against 
the state, thus exposing his own fears: "Šall those colored revolutions are not 
revolutions at all. They are plain banditry disguised by democracy," (4) "The joint 
actions of the state and society against any attempt to destabilize the situation 
will be harsh and adequate," (5) etc. 
 
Lukashenko recently held the biggest military exercise in Belarus since 
independence in 1991. "We must be prepared to fight every day," said the 
President. (6) The President has not hesitated to use force to disperse any 
resistance on the streets of Minsk throughout recent years. Thousands of 
protesters have been arrested and often are abused, and many opposition 
leaders have disappeared without a trace over the course of the past several 
years. 
 
Lukashenko has no intentions of leaving his post and is prepared to use force to 
suppress any resistance. Therefore, should a revolution take place, it is likely to 
be bloody and violent, and democracy will have little chance of triumphing. Daily 
life for an average Belarusian, already difficult, likely will become even more 
difficult, and a new regime might well impose more rigid Stalinesque repressions, 
which would plague opposition members and the uninvolved alike. 
 
UKRAINE 
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Rinat Akhmetov flees 
Rinat Akhmetov, the richest man in Ukraine and ex-oligarch, who is worth $2.4 
billion, is said to have left the country. (7) It is likely that his decision to leave 
reflects his concern at becoming Ukraine¹s Khodorkovsky. Thus far, no criminal 
charges have been raised against Mr. Akhmetov. The government only wants a 
statement from him regarding the privatization of the Donetsk-region coal mines, 
steel mills and other privatized Soviet industries. Akhmetov is not taking any 
chances, however. His closest associate – Boris Kolesnikov was arrested 
recently, which gave Mr. Akhmetov an even stronger incentive to flee. Akhmetov 
and a small group of Ukrainian oligarchs made fortunes in the 1990s by 
collaborating with corrupt government officials. 
 
The new Ukrainian government has been aggressive about pursuing violations 
from the privatizations when former President Leonid Kuchma was in power – 
theoretically, it is an effort to reduce corruption and attract foreign direct 
investment. However, many Ukrainian industrial barons have left the country 
since February in order to avoid persecution. Rinat Akhmetov is said to be in 
Spain at the moment. 
 
MOLDOVA 
Government-Opposition rapprochement 
Throughout the pre-election campaign, Moldovan opposition parties publicly 
demonstrated their strong disagreement with Communist Party policies and 
attempted to highlight differences between their political programs and that of the 
ruling party. There was speculation that the opposition was organizing mass 
protests and threatening to block the presidential vote in order to force early 
parliamentary elections. And yet, Vladimir Voronin comfortably won reelection 
and the opposition suddenly seems more willing to cooperate with the winning 
party and president.  Why did the opposition have such a sudden (at least on the 
surface) change of heart? 
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There are many reasons for such a sharp turn towards collaboration with the 
government: Firstly, the Moldovan opposition failed to unite before the elections, 
failing to show Voronin any realistic resistance. Even if opposition parties did 
manage to get together, the chance of them winning the majority of parliamentary 
seats was minuscule, due in part to lack of media exposure and the population's 
general satisfaction with Voronin¹s rule. Consequently, each party's failure to 
garner sufficient electoral support drove their decisions to line up behind the 
winner, the Communist Party, after the election. 
 
Secondly, Voronin¹s sharp turn towards the West, his apparent devotion to the 
goal of bringing Moldova to the European Union, his determination to eliminate 
the Russian presence in Transdniestr, his meetings with Yushchenko and 
Saakashvili close to the elections, all deprived the opposition of any strong 
argument against the Communists. These developments proved once more that 
the goals of the Communist and opposition parties were very similar indeed, 
bringing the opposition to the final realization that much more could be 
accomplished by working together with Voronin¹s party. 
 
The Communist Party also showed its desire to collaborate with the opposition by 
making the unprecedented move of nominating Marian Lupu (a young politician, 
not a KPRM member) for the post of Parliamentary Speaker. Lupu was approved 
unanimously by the newly-elected parliament. It seems that Voronin recognizes 
the fact that his old Communist party colleagues alone could not help him realize 
his ambitious plans for Moldova. 
 
Finally, there are speculations that the Opposition-Government "joint venture" 
was created with the assistance of some Western intermediaries, which helps 
minimize the risk of breaching this unwritten partnership agreement. 
 
This new rapprochement seems to benefit everyone involved. Voronin and his 
party enjoy political stability in the country; the opposition benefits from its 
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opinion being taken into consideration when political decisions are made, and 
society as a whole has more hope for positive changes when the strongest 
political forces in the country work together for the common goal. 
 
It is to be hoped that this new political partnership will bring the desired results.  
Since there is no more justification for the opposing sides to be carping at one 
another, they will be obliged to engage in meaningful discussion and show the 
population concrete actions – a task much more challenging than exchanging 
caustic remarks. 
 
Source notes: 
 
(1) Rice Calls for Change in Belarus, BBC new, 21 Apr 05 via 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4467299.stm). 
(2) Khartiya 97 website, 22 Apr 05 via (www.charetr97.org). 
(3) The Moscow News, "Who is Against Lukashenko?" by Anna Rudnitskaya, 3 
Nov 04 via Lexis Nexis. 
(4) China Daily, 20 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Vremya novostey, 20 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Agence France Press, 2 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 21 Apr 05 via (www.pravda.com.ua). 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
ARMENIA 
Remembering the victims Š preparing for revolution? 
Last weekend, Armenians around the world commemorated the 90th anniversary 
of the mass killings of up to 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman Turks. The killings, 
officially labeled genocide by 15 countries, most historians and all recognized 
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human rights groups, began when the Ottoman government arrested over 200 
leading Armenian intellectuals on April 24, 1915. These individuals were soon 
executed, and the forced relocation of Armenians from Anatolia to Syria began. 
During this brutal relocation, over hundreds of miles of desert, documents 
suggest that 1.5 million Armenians died from starvation, illness or violence. 
 
On April 24 in Yerevan, officials organized what may have been the largest 
demonstration in the country¹s history; nearly one million people gathered to 
honor those who died in the attacks. Official delegations from the 15 countries 
recognizing the "Armenian Genocide" -- including France, Britain and Poland -- 
attended ceremonies at the national genocide memorial. They then joined the 
country¹s 3.8 million residents for one minute of silence. 
 
Armenian officials effectively used the press attention created by the 
commemoration as part of their stepped-up campaign to force Turkey to admit 
that the actions of 1915-1917 rose to the level of genocide. A key component of 
this campaign recently has been to try to make this admission a requirement of 
Turkey¹s EU accession agreement. "We would very much like it if this issue was 
raised by this organization [the EU] as a prerequisite," Armenian Foreign Minister 
Vardan Oskanian said. (1) 
 
The country received support last week from German parliamentarians who gave 
preliminary approval to a resolution that asks Turkey to take responsibility for 
"massacres" and "expulsion" during 1915. Germany¹s Christian Democratic 
Union-Christian Social Union Bloc member Erwin Marschewski said that the EU 
requires countries to "shine a spotlight on the dark pages of our history." He 
continued, "Recognition by Turkey of the Armenian genocide of 1915 and 1916 is 
important." The Bundestag resolution also pointedly asks Armenia¹s 
"forgiveness" for Germany¹s "co-responsibility" for the massacres, by virtue of its 
alliance with Ottoman Turkey and its "failure to take effective measures" to stop 
the killings. (2) 
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At the same time, French President Jacques Chirac made a significant gesture 
by accompanying Armenian President Robert Kocharian to a Paris monument 
honoring victims of the killings. And former Polish President Lech Walesa 
suggested that Turkey at least should be questioned about the killings before it is 
admitted to the EU. (3) 
 
Although Turkey continues to maintain that the killings were the result of "civil 
strife" and not genocide, and that both sides lost "hundreds of thousands" during 
those years, the country suggested a joint commission should study the issue. 
"Turkey is ready to face its history," Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said. He 
claimed that Turkey¹s version of events would be vindicated, apparently ignoring 
significant documents that have been recognized by historians throughout the 
world as proving otherwise. 
 
All of this activity was welcomed by Kocharian, who used every opportunity to 
frame himself and his government as an essential protector of Armenia¹s future. 
"Today we bow our heads in remembrance of those who died, filled with grief," 
he said, "but also in the certainty that the government of Armenia is a guarantor 
of the safety and eternal nature of Armenians." (4) 
 
The commemoration, for all its necessity and grace, could not have come at a 
better time for the Armenian president, whose government is facing increased 
pressure from political opponents. The spirit of roses and oranges has infected 
Armenia¹s politicians, and proclamations of revolution are abundant. While these 
proclamations likely have little possibility of becoming reality, the willingness of 
so many anti-Kocharian political leaders to speak them so loudly suggests that 
the president¹s iron hold on the country may be waning. 
 
The opposition Justice Party recently stated that it is "an adherent to evolutionary 
and peaceful changes. However, if unpredictable events occur when changing 
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power, Kocharian and the ruling coalition will be responsible for it." (5) The Bloc¹s 
leader, and one of the main opposition activists in Armenia, told a recent 
gathering of opposition parties, "President Robert Kocharian likes to call Armenia 
an organized country. If you speak of falsifications, violence, lies and corruption, 
then Armenia is well-organized," Stepan Demarchian said. "The resignation of 
the incumbent is the number one desire of society, and the consolidation of all 
healthy political forces of the country is necessary here." (6) 
 
At the same time, the opposition Republic Party (not to be confused with the pro-
government Republican Party), called for the "liquidation of the authoritarian, 
administrative-clan regime and its substitution with a political, economic and 
social system based on democratic principles." A statement released by the party 
said, "A democratic revolution in Armenia is possible in the case of unity and 
consolidation of healthy political and nongovernmental forces. The Republic 
Party is ready for unity." (7) 
 
President Kocharian¹s response to these statements has been calm and 
dismissive, even though some of his own allies -- most importantly the 
parliamentary speaker -- have begun casting about for possible new coalitions. 
"We often read in the press that our [Armenian] opposition is very weak and 
bad," he said. "It has failed not because it is working badly but simply because 
the authorities in our country are working more effectively and better." (8) 
 
And in fact, Kocharian is partly correct. Unlike the Georgians, Ukrainians and 
Kyrgyz prior to their revolutions, Armenians generally receive their pensions and 
wages, thanks to large subsidies from Russia. Even more, Armenians have a 
relatively developed local administrative structure and civic culture, meaning that 
the central authorities control far less of the day-to-day governance than in most 
other former Soviet republics. This fact provides a significant psychological buffer 
for the authorities in Yerevan, although these authorities are careful to keep their 
local representatives in line. 
 39 
 
Even more important, the Armenian opposition¹s history is filled with unrealized 
potential. Internal bickering, shortsightedness and over inflated egos regularly 
have combined to undermine any possibility of success. Kocharian cannot be 
blamed for thinking that this latest wave of proclamations in favor of unity also will 
fail. 
 
Still, the president¹s increased focus on external disagreements with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan (see NIS Observed, 6 Apr 05 combined with numerous statements 
playing down the possibility of revolution, point to his uneasiness over the 
domestic situation. And although the economic situation may seem stable, it is 
far from satisfactory. This week¹s genocide commemoration may have served as 
a temporary distraction, but in the coming months, as the country prepares for 
Fall¹s local administration elections, Kocharian will face a shifting domestic 
environment newly informed by the examples of its neighbors. 
 
GEORGIA 
Real progress, or real politik? 
Earlier this week, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili and her 
Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov completed the latest round of talks over the 
withdrawal of Russia¹s army bases from Georgia. Following the talks, 
Zourabichvili announced that, for the first time, the countries had made "concrete 
progress." She said a deadline for the bases¹ withdrawal had been preliminarily 
reached -- January 1, 2008 -- as well as an agreement that the process would 
entail a phased withdrawal to begin within one year and the inclusion of a 
detailed schedule for withdrawal within the final agreement. (9) 
 
Lavrov also noted "real progress," and said, "We agree that the pullout will be 
done in stages and will begin, assuming we sign an agreement, this year." (10) 
 
  
 40 
 
It is Lavrov¹s five words -- "assuming we sign an agreement" -- that are the 
problem. Although both foreign ministers said they had sent "an agreement" to 
their presidents to sign, Zourabichvili said that she would withhold her final 
recommendation to President Mikhail Saakashvili until she receives further 
details in writing. "It is a matter of trust," she said. "We know from the past that 
Russia has ignored many agreements and treaties [with the Georgian side]." 
Further, she said, "The devil is in the details." (11) 
 
Zourabichvili has been through numerous rounds of negotiations that have ended 
badly. In fact, just two weeks ago, talks in Tbilisi ended in frustration and 
recrimination. 
 
At that time, Georgian officials expressed concern over a number of periphery 
conditions proposed by Russia. Russia was demanding that Georgia clearly state 
within the base closure agreement that it would forbid the future deployment of all 
"third country" troops on its territory. (12) Russia also continued to request that 
Georgia pay the relocation costs of its troops and equipment. Georgia refused to 
accept either of these points. 
 
Although numerous Georgian officials stated that the country does not plan to 
allow non-Georgian bases on its territory, following the previous negotiations, 
Parliamentary Chairperson Nino Burjanadze said, "Deployment or non-
deployment of foreign military bases on Georgian territory is Georgia¹s internal 
affair." (13) Both Burjanadze and Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli also reiterated 
that "we are not going to pay any compensation." They did suggest, however, 
that perhaps the international community would assist Russia in this regard. (14) 
 
At the time, Georgia reportedly demanded that Russian bases be operated only 
in "pull-out mode." This would eliminate the possibility of conducting military 
exercises and end troop rotation. The Georgian side also continued to push for 
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the base in Gaduata, Abkhazia to be included in the new closure agreement, 
since the country doubts Russia¹s claim that it has already been shut down 
(especially given recent admissions by Abkhaz military officials that their troops 
are being trained by Russian military officers). Russia objected to these 
stipulations. 
 
It appears that at least one of these sticking points -- that the base be operated in 
pull-out mode -- may have been overcome by Russia¹s verbal agreement this 
week to a phased withdrawal. However, the rest of the points remain. 
 
The base closure agreement is far from complete. It seems, however, that the 
leaders of Georgia and Russia are attempting to avoid the triggering of a 
Georgian parliamentary resolution that would outlaw bases if at least a 
preliminary agreement on their closure isn¹t reached prior to May 15. Russia in 
particular seems to have -- at least momentarily -- blinked. Izvestia wrote, "The 
Georgians intended to restrict the movement of Russian militaries on the 
Georgian territory. Georgia also intended to ban the military trainings of the 
Russian militaries. And suddenly a miracle happened -- Moscow has given up. 
Without a fight. Quietly." (15) 
 
That seems hard to believe, particularly for Zourabichvili. She refused to 
backtrack on her earlier statement connecting Saakashvili¹s attendance at 
Moscow¹s VE Day anniversary celebration to an agreement over the bases. "The 
[Georgian] president will analyze the results of these negotiations," she said. 
"Then, he will decide whether the results are worth for him to go to Moscow on 
the 9th of May." (16) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Agence France Presse, 02:57 GMT, 19 Apr 05 via Yahoo News. 
(2) Deutsche Welle, 22 Apr 05 via (www.dw-world.de). 
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(5) ARMINFO, "Opposition Justice Bloc is Adherent of Evolutionary and Peaceful 
Changes in Armenia," 13 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) ARMINFO, "Consolidation of All Healthy Political Forces of Country 
Necessary," 13 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) ARMINFO, "Democratic Revolution in Armenia is Possible," 15 Apr 05 via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Public Television of Armenia, 1600 GMT, 11 Apr 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Civil Georgia, 2347 GMT, 25 Apr 05 via (www.civil.ge). 
(10) Agence France Presse, 0835 GMT, 26 Apr 05 via Yahoo News. 
(11) Civil Georgia, 2347 GMT, 25 Apr 05 via (www.civil.ge). 
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(14) Interfax, 1826 GMT, 25 Apr 05 via (www.interfax.ru). 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Unexpected unified opposition candidate emerging? 
Last month it emerged that Kazakhstan's most important opposition party, Ak 
Zhol was undergoing a major crisis, in which a vote of no confidence was called 
and passed against Altynbek Sarsenbayev, one of the party's co-chairman.  
Sarsenbayev's apparent transgression lay in that he had participated in 'coalition' 
talks with other opposition groups, aimed at finding a single opposition candidate 
to stand against President Nursultan Nazarbaev in elections now slated for 
December  (instead of January) 2006. (1) It seemed likely at the time that this 
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unified candidate would be a prominent figure--such as Sarsenbayev, Bolat 
Abilov, or even former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin—from the innermost 
circles of Kazakhstan's opposition. That assessment may not have been correct. 
It is now evident that a new voice within the opposition has emerged. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of last September's Parliamentary elections, 
Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, speaker of the Majlis and Deputy Chairman of 
Nazarbaev's Otan Party resigned. Almost concurrently, he published a letter in 
Vremya alleging that there had been massive violations during the elections. (2) 
Early in April, Tuyakbai, along with Abilov and Sarsenbayev, traveled to Moscow, 
where they met with Russian opposition members. An interview given to 
Nezavisimaya gazeta during the visit revealed that he will be Nazarbaev's "only 
rival" in the elections. (3) 
 
During the interview Tuyakbai revealed that the opposition had links with "the 
West" and from "international organizations," and expected to receive support 
from them. He also revealed that Abilov had traveled to Kiev to observe 
opposition activities there during the Orange Revolution. (4) Finally, Tuyakbai 
expressed the view that Nazarbaev would not hesitate to use force to maintain 
his family's monopoly on power in Kazakhstan. (5) 
 
There are two reasons why Tuyakbai's warning cannot lightly be dismissed; first, 
in the aftermath of President Akaev's ouster, Nazarbaev publicly stated that the 
revolution had been possible only through "weakness" on Akaev's part – a tacit 
statement that his Kyrgyz counterpart should have used force. (6) Secondly, in 
what could be interpreted as a warning from Nazarbaev to the opposition through 
a "third party," two Pro-Presidential parties, the Agrarian Party and the Citizens 
Party, announced that they were willing to "take up arms" to "defend the country's 
sovereignty and citizens' free choice" should it become necessary. (7) 
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While the government's threat to use force is in the background, two events in 
recent days indicate that Nazarbaev is also employing another approach. On 20 
April, Nazarbaev dismissed Zagipa Baliyeva from her post as head of the 
country's Central Election Commission. Baliyeva was replaced by Justice 
Minister Onalsyn Zhumabekov. Zhumabekov is viewed by many in Kazakhstan 
as an untarnished figure, who has made his career independently, without 
patronage. (8) Nazarbaev clearly hopes that Baliyeva's replacement with an 
'independent' will silence allegations that the Central Election Commission is 
corrupt and guilty of vote rigging, and will neutralize a key point of contention for 
the opposition. A day later, speaking at the Eurasian Media Forum, the President 
stated that he viewed "freedom of speech and the media" as integral to the 
country's democratic process, and that in his view, Kazakhstan's media 
represented a broad spectrum of political views, including "radically opposition" 
orientations. (9) 
 
These actions and statements indicate a 'carrot and stick' approach by 
Nazarbaev. He is clearly concerned by events in Kyrgyzstan, and is asserting his 
determination to maintain power by force if necessary, while at the same time 
attempting to placate the opposition by removing the deeply controversial figure 
of Baliyeva.  But Nazarbaev's concerns are likely to prove unfounded; 
September's election results which handed the opposition a huge defeat, 
witnessed no mass protests or public outcry. Moreover, there is no indication that 
Nazarbaev is deeply unpopular, either in the cities or the countryside, a fact 
which differentiates him from former Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev. Finally, 
Nazarbaev has been extremely successful in neutralizing or silencing anyone 
who might emerge to challenge him. At this point in time therefore, it must be 
said that a successful challenge of Nazarbaev is unlikely—as is the chance of a 
Kazakh revolution. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Update 
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Almost a month ago, after spontaneous riots and looting in Bishkek, the 
government of President Askar Akaev collapsed. Akaev, along with his family 
fled the country, flying first to Kazakhstan and then to Moscow, where he 
currently remains. In order to fill the leadership vacuum left by Akaev, the Kyrgyz 
Parliament appointed an interim government consisting of the country's three 
major opposition figures, Kurmanbek Bakiev (Prime Minister & President), Roza 
Otunbaeva (Foreign Minister) and Feliks Kulov (Security & Law Enforcement). 
(10) 
 
On 2 April, President Akaev agreed to resign upon receipt of "appropriate 
guarantees" for his personal safety and immunity from future prosecution "in 
compliance with the law." (11) Although technically free to do so, Akaev has not 
returned – and is unlikely to do so – to Kyrgyzstan. 
 
It was clear that the battle for the presidency would develop into a two-horse race 
between Kulov and Bakiev. While the latter announced his candidacy on April 1, 
Kulov was forced to hold off any announcement until the Supreme Court ruled on 
the legality of the convictions he received in 2001 for economic crimes. Although 
encouraging from a democratic perspective, the prospect of a race between the 
two men also presents problems: first, each candidate draws support from a 
different region of the state—opening the prospect of a divided country. Second, 
having served as Interior Minister and Head of the National Security Service 
during Akaev's Presidency, Kulov reportedly commands the loyalty of these 
agencies, leading to fears of possible intervention on his behalf. (12) 
 
On April 7, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court began to hear evidence from Kulov's 
lawyers regarding his conviction. All in all, three acquittals were issued by the 
Judges on separate days: on the 11th, Kulov was cleared of criminally exceeding 
his authority while serving as Minister of National Security; (13) on the 13th, 
embezzlement charges were thrown out (14), while on the 15th, Kulov was 
cleared of corruption. (15) 
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Speaking after his acquittal, Kulov stated that he would base his decision to run 
or not on the outcome of planned consultations with Bakiev. (16) Those 
consultations have now taken place. During a telephone interview with Kyrgyz 
Television First Channel, during which he revealed that he and Kulov had met 
"four or five times" during the last ten days, and had reached agreement to hold 
"fair elections and a fair fight." (17) 
 
Roza Otunbayeva would seem to have taken on the role of mediator or conduit 
between the two leading candidates even before their bilateral consultations: on 
12 April, she told the press that she believed Kulov would run, and that if he lost 
the election, a post would be found for him in the government. (18) Otunbayeva's 
role provides evidence that all three figures are aware of the potential damage of 
a North-South divide in the country, and of the forces (Interior and National 
Security Service) which could interfere in the election (now slated not for 26 June 
but 10 July) if the outcome is not to their liking. That they are attempting, in 
advance, to prevent further unrest or schisms is somehow reassuring.  
 
Source Notes: 
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(3) Nezavisimaya gazeta Moscow in Russian, 1 Apr 05; BBC Monitoring via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(4) Ibid. 
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